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Abstract
Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern European countries
face an increasing threat to their media pluralism and democracies after a lot
of media corporations fell in the hands of local owners. The region is plagued
by “mini-Murdochs,” and Bulgaria is a case in point. This study investigates a
subset  of  Bulgarian  online  newspaper  readers’  perceptions  of  the  state  of
journalism. The article presents the results from a qualitative analysis of 1,583
comments about the media war between the country’s biggest press groups. It
focuses  on  178  comments  that  discuss  the  role  of  journalists.  Readers
differentiate between “ideal  journalism” and “real  journalism.”  The former is
based on an idealized view of journalists as detached watchdogs, whereas the
latter  depicts  a  dire  picture  of  journalists  as  manipulative  servants of  their
owners. The virtual space is a vibrant arena for democratic discussions and
can  also  potentially  serve  as  an  accountability  tool  for  journalists.  A
reconceptualization of Habermas’s public sphere is needed if we are to more
clearly understand how vibrant online spaces contribute to democracy even if
they fall short of his normative ideal.
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On July 11, 2014, Bulgarians woke up to the news that $136 million have disappeared
from  the  fourth  biggest  lender—Corporate  Commercial  Bank.  The  news  spread
quickly around the world and the New York Times1 reported that the Bulgarian Central
Bank had accused the biggest shareholder Tsvetan Vasilev of taking the money from
the bank’s  vaults in sacks.  From one of  the country’s  most respected  and affluent
businessmen, Vasilev turned overnight into an alleged criminal wanted by Interpol.
The  bank  was  shut  down  and  lenders  were  denied  access  to  their  deposits.  The
international press1 also picked up on the fact that the bank’s surprising ordeal started
after the local news outlets reported on a feud between Vasilev and Delyan Peevski, a
media mogul and member of parliament (MP). “Mr. Peevski accused Mr. Vasilev of
hiring people to kill him, and Mr. Vasilev has made similar accusations.”1 Prior to this,
they were close allies. The “Murdoch of the East,”2 Peevski was the behind-the-scenes
owner of the biggest press group (officially headed by his mother). His company was
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allegedly financed by Vasilev and his bank, and PM Boyko Borisov’s first government
was accused of “indirectly subsidising” it by depositing public funds in the bank.3
What  sounds like  a  film scenario  is  a  logical  development  in  a  country  where
politicians, media owners, and businessmen have increasingly become interlocked in
“an  informal  power  alliance.”2 The demise of  communism in Central  and  Eastern
Europe brought about an influx of foreign investment and liberalization, but the global
financial  crisis  in  2007–2008  led  to  a  worrying  development—investors  started
withdrawing and a lot of big media fell in the hands of politicians or businessmen with
strong political agendas (Hume 2011; Štětka 2012). As Štětka2 points out, Central and
Eastern European countries are now “plagued by their own mini-Murdochs—and in
these more fragile democracies, they represent an even bigger threat.” Bulgaria is one
of the most extreme examples because the feud between Vasilev and Peevski was only
the tip of the iceberg in a long-running war for political and economic power between
the two biggest press corporations—Peevski’s New Bulgarian Media Group (NBMG)
and his rivals’ (also well-known local businessmen) Media Group Bulgaria (MGB).
The war was led on the pages of their newspapers and on TV, and politicians and the
judicial system were implicated in it via corruption allegations and lawsuits.
These regional processes of “Berlusconization” (Coman 2010: 58) went hand-in-
hand with an important  global  trend—the advent  of the Internet  and social  media,
which brought about “unprecedented structural changes” in journalism as a profession
(Weaver and Wilnat 2012: 1). The implications are multifold—from a blurring of the
line between media “professionals” and their audiences to a rethinking of journalistic
professionalism and speculations about the future/end of journalism. In the Bulgarian
context,  these  interlinked  developments  present  us  with  a  unique  opportunity  to
investigate audiences’ views of the state of journalism as well as the “ideals” they
believe in.  This is  precisely what  this study will  do by qualitatively analyzing the
unsolicited views of a subset of online readers about the media war as posted in 1,583
comments on newspapers’ websites. It will give us an insight into an underresearched
context (a new Eastern European democracy) where online readers appear to be much
more active than readers in established democracies (Richardson and Stanyer 2011) or
non-democratic  countries.  Moreover,  while  on  one  hand,  “scholars  have  been
extensively and continuously tracking what journalists themselves think about their
role in society” (van der Wurff and Schoenbach 2014: 434), and on the other hand,
online  comments  have  been  studied  from  different  angles  (e.g.,  McCluskey  and
Hmielowski 2011; Nielsen 2014; Papacharissi 2004), the public’s views on journalism
have rarely been researched. When they have, they were usually solicited by surveys
and questionnaires with predetermined notions/concepts (e.g.,  Chung 2009; Lowrey
and Anderson 2005). Yet, as  van der Wurff and Schoenbach (2014: 447) argue, it is
important  to  research  audiences’  perceptions  now more than ever  because  of  “the
shifting power relations between (what used to be) senders and receivers in the current
media environment.” Moreover, readers are important stakeholders in the debate about
what journalistic professionalism entails if journalism’s main function is to serve the
public interest. The project also allows us to revisit Habermas’s notion of the public
sphere—while online boards have a deliberative democratic  potential, most studies
demonstrate  that  this  potential  is  not  realized  (Dahlberg  2001;  Papacharissi  2002;
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Richardson and Stanyer 2011). This study adds further weight to a growing body of
research that calls for a reconceptualization of Habermas’s normative ideal.
What Is Journalism? Audiences’ Views
The conceptualization of journalism as a profession recently regained momentum due
to the challenges posed by the “digital revolution” and the rapid advent of “citizen”
journalists. Most of our knowledge of journalistic professionalism is based on studies
with  journalists—predominantly  surveys  (albeit  with  categories  predetermined  by
academics) indicating what their role perceptions are. Thus, The Worlds of Journalism
(2014)  study,  aimed  at  mapping  “journalism’s  cultures”  in  twenty-one  countries,
shows  that  journalists  play  four  roles:  (1)  detached  watchdogs,  (2)  populist
disseminators, (3) opportunist facilitators, and (4) critical change agents. It argues that
there is a “global primacy of role perceptions” of “detachment and non-involvement,”
being a watchdog of government and providing political information (Hanitzsch et al.
2011: 286). This grand claim can hardly be made about Bulgaria, however, because
only 14 percent of Bulgarian journalists fall into the “detached watchdog” category;
35 percent  see themselves  as  populist  disseminators,  32 percent  as  critical  change
agents,  and  19  percent  as  opportunist  facilitators  (Worlds  of  Journalism  2014).
Moreover, Curry (1990 as quoted in Örnebring 2009) and Wolfe (2005 as quoted in
Örnebring 2009) claim that although there is a clear sense of professionalism among
Eastern European journalists, it is based on very different values from the ones their
Western colleagues cherish. Lauk (2009: 71) explains that despite efforts to export the
Anglo-American model in Central and Eastern Europe, “there are no successful cases
of  replacing  the  Communist  model  with  a  ‘western’  one.”  Similarly,  Weaver  and
Wilnat’s  (2012:  545)  edited  volume,  which  presents  the  results  of  surveys  with
twenty-nine thousand journalists from thirty-one countries, shows that there is “little
evidence of a trend toward a global journalism culture,” because “journalistic values
and norms depend heavily on social,  political,  and  cultural  contexts.”  The reports
produced as part of the “Media and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe” project
(2009–2013) and Coman’s (2004, 2010) studies in neighboring Romania give further
weight to these claims.
While “scholars have been extensively and continuously tracking what journalists
themselves think about their role in society” (van der Wurff and Schoenbach 2014:
434), “research on audience perceptions and demands of news journalism is scarce and
fragmented.” This is surprising, given that the normative justification of journalistic
professionalism is often based on the public  interest  notion. In  their  representative
survey in the Netherlands,  van der Wurff  and Schoenbach (2014) demonstrate that
audiences’ perceptions of journalism are not fundamentally different from the ones
shared  by  journalists.  Similarly,  Lowrey  and  Anderson’s  (2005)  U.S.  respondents
“have  a  high  opinion  of  journalism  as  an  occupation.”  Chung  (2009) reveals  a
mismatch between online community newspaper readers’  views on perceived  roles
and  journalists’  perceptions  in  representative  surveys.  The  findings  are  really
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interesting indeed because  they run counter  to popular  claims that  the audience  is
“uninterested  and  hedonistic”  (van  der  Wurff  and  Schoenbach  2014:  447).
Nonetheless,  all these studies are based on quantitative surveys with predetermined
questions. They offer audiences’ views of existing and predefined (by journalists and
academics) roles and values. However, the online space presents a unique opportunity
for us—the ability to “observe” and analyze naturally occurring public conversations
between a subset of audience members and to explore their unsolicited views. This is
exactly what this article aims to do.
Why Online Comments?
Lots of recent studies (see below) use online comments as the object of their analysis.
Key  topics  explored  are  the  potential  for  democratic  deliberation,  interactivity,
participatory  journalism,  and  audience  empowerment  as  well  as  ethical  issues—
anonymity,  (in)civility,  bigotry,  and  so forth.  Why is  it  important  to  study online
comments?  First,  they  are  a  key  interactive  feature  that  illustrates  the  changing
relationship between news producers  and audiences—the potential  for  participatory
journalism and  audience  empowerment.  They also  offer  journalists  “new  ways  of
knowing about their audiences” (MacGregor 2007: 280). Second, at least in theory,
like  the  letters-to-the-editor  sections,  online  boards  provide  arenas  for  “public
discussion  by  regular  citizens”  (Wahl-Jorgensen  2002:  69),  and  as  such  have  a
deliberative democratic potential (Dahlberg 2001; Papacharissi 2002; Richardson and
Stanyer 2011). As Eveland et al. (2011: 1089) explain, “deliberative theory suggests
that individuals should come together to share information and consider one another’s
opinions on the important political issues of the day—and that this will improve the
practice of democracy.” The quality of argumentation is of paramount importance—“a
process  whereby  claims  are  attacked  and  defended  and  differences  of  opinion
resolved” (Richardson and Stanyer 2011: 986).  Most empirical  investigations (e.g.,
Bergström  2008;  Richardson  and  Stanyer  2011)  suggest  that  this  potential  is  not
realized precisely because of the low quality of argumentation. Instead of extending
the public sphere or leading to the development of a virtual  one (Dahlberg 2001),
online boards often turn into “a place where unashamed bigotry is all too easy to find”
(Washington as quoted in  Santana 2014: 20). Studies (Hlavach and Freivogel 2011;
McCluskey  and  Hmielowski  2011;  Reader  2012;  Santana  2014)  explore  the  role
anonymity plays. Santana (2014: 28) claims that “there is a dramatic improvement in
the level of civility in online conversations when anonymity is removed,” but he also
warns that banning anonymous comments may have adverse implications such as a
reduction in the number of participants and the range of views. Although incivility is
clearly a hindrance (Papacharissi 2004), McCluskey and Hmielowski’s (2011) study
shows that anonymity encourages wider participation. Proponents of anonymity argue
that it “allows people to speak truth to powerful institutions” and banning it will not
curb the underlying attitudes that lead to incivility, racism, or bigotry (Reader 2012).
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Overall,  most investigations based closely on Habermas’s  normative ideal  reach
pessimistic conclusions. This has led some scholars to argue for a move away from
deliberation, because “the deliberative framing of political conversation research can
lead to unrealistic expectations about the function of political conversation” (Eveland
et  al.  2011:  1086).  Papacharissi  (2002) and  Loke  (2013) offer  a  more  nuanced
approach.  They differentiate between the public sphere and the public space.  Loke
(2013: 184) argues that comment sections should be seen as “a new public space and
should not be confused as the new public sphere.”  A public sphere can consist  of
different  public  spaces.  The  difference  is  that  while  “a  virtual  space  enhances
discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy” (Papacharissi 2002: 11).
This  is  the main theoretical  premise this article  is  built  on—though not  a  fully
fledged  investigation  of  the  deliberative  democratic  potential  of  online  comments
(conducted as part of the wider study—see Slavtcheva-Petkova 2015), it will offer a
useful account of virtual discussions about journalism. As Dahlgren (2005: 160) puts
it,
while it is  important to keep a clear perspective and not exaggerate the extent of the
activities or their impact, it would also be foolish to underestimate what seems to be a
major development in the contemporary history of Western democracy.
This article will contribute to this body of literature in four ways. First, it is narrowly
focused  on  readers’  views  of  journalism.  Second,  unlike  most  studies  that  utilize
predominantly quantitative research frameworks and rely on academics’/journalists’
preconceived views and ideals, comments are analyzed in an open-ended qualitative
way by adopting a grounded theory approach.  Third,  the project  also shows some
scope for optimism. Online readers in our sample seem much more active than readers
in established democracies. Richardson and Stanyer (2011) found on average nineteen
comments per article in a study of U.K. newspapers, versus thirty per article in my
Bulgarian sample. The views they express about journalism show that these discussion
spaces can be vibrant arenas for democratic debate. Finally, it will focus on a slightly
different  context  from  the  ones  frequently  explored—an  Eastern  European  new
democracy.
As  Ruiz  et  al.  (2011:  482)  point  out,  “the  cultural  context  is  relevant  to  the
democratic  qualities  of  the  debates.”  While  sharing  the  fundamental  values  of
democracy,  democracies  in  transition  experience  teething  problems.  The transition
from communism to democracy “has been far from smooth” (Örnebring 2009: 7). As
already  indicated,  there  is  not  much  evidence  of  the  “global  primacy  of  role
perceptions  that  are  characterised  by  detachment  and  non-involvement”  in  the
Bulgarian case (Hanitzsch et al. 2011: 286). Moreover, even in the early years after the
fall of the Berlin wall, Jakubowicz (1998/1999: 27) reported a high level of distrust in
journalists in Central and Eastern Europe due to the fact that “lip service is paid to one
set of concepts as regards the media and journalism, while quite different ones are
applied in practice.”  Coman’s  (2004,  2010) more recent  studies  in Romania show
similar  trends.  Increasingly  academics  started  using  the  terms  Italianization or
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Mediterraneanization to describe the situation in post-communist countries (Dobek-
Ostrowska 2012; Jakubowicz & Sukösd 2008).
“Plagued by Mini-Murdochs”—Journalism in Eastern and 
Central Europe in the Context of the Bulgarian Media Wars
Eastern and Central European countries have gone through a rapid period of political
and  economic  transformation  in  the  last  twenty  years.  Communist  regimes  were
replaced by democracies and most countries “swapped” the Soviet sphere of influence
and the Warsaw Pact with membership in the European Union and North Atlantic
Treaty  Organization.  As  Metyková and  Císarová  (2009:  721) point  out,  “within  a
relatively short period of time privately owned media and public service broadcasting
were established in these countries.” Foreign investors bought media companies or
established new ones. However, the global financial crisis brought about a worrying
regional trend—the withdrawal of foreign owners and appropriation of companies by
“local entrepreneurs who are interested in harvesting the political potential of these
now-established media venues” (Hume 2011: 6). Štětka (2012: 441) argues that the
recession was not the only reason why foreign investors withdrew. Another key factor
is “the increasing inability to compete in an environment ruled by other-than-market
rules” due to “the widespread abuse of power” and “the close intertwining of oligarchs
and political power”(as pointed out by the CEO of WAZ Bodo Hombach). As a result,
the region is now “plagued by their own mini-Murdochs—and in these more fragile
democracies, they represent an even bigger threat.”2 According to Hombach, oligarchs
are buying local media “not in order to win money” but “in order to exert political
influence” to “promote business or political interests” (Štětka 2012: 441).
Bulgaria is a typical example of these worrying developments. The country’s free
press rankings considerably dropped and it is now classified as “partly free.” 3 Most
newspapers are owned by two media groups—MGB, which was part of the German
newspaper  group  WAZ  till  2010  but  then  fell  in  the  hands  of  local  owners,  and
NBMG.2 Thirty-five-year-old MP Delyan Peevski was the “de facto owner” of the
latter until a few months ago. The corporation is allegedly related to the Movement for
Rights  and  Freedoms—established  as  “a  party  of  the  Turkish  ethic  minority”
(Tabakova 2014).  It  has  “a history of strongly supporting whichever  party was in
power” and its owner is one of the most controversial figures—“practically running”
his  mother’s  newspapers  “by  deciding on front  page  articles  and  editorial  policy”
(Štětka 2012: 448). Although similar intertwining of oligarchs and political power is
evident in other countries in the region, Bulgaria and Romania exemplify “the crudest
cases of political instrumentalization” (Štětka 2012: 448).
Peevski’s political career has not gone unnoticed even in Western media. Although
still a twenty-one-year-old student, he was appointed parliamentary secretary to the
minister of transport as well as chair of the Board of Directors of the biggest port in
Bulgaria. Then at 25, he became a deputy minister.5 Peevski has been an elected MP
from the Movement for Rights and Freedom since 2009. Euractiv6 describes him “as a
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symbol of the shady power brokerage that has impoverished Bulgarians and ruined the
country’s reputation.” Freedom House (2014) notes that “opaque collusion between
media owners and political leaders came to the fore in June 2013 when the Socialist-
led  ruling  coalition”  appointed  Peevski  as  head  of  the  State  Agency  for  National
Security[AQ10]. His appointment was reversed because it led to a mass wave of street
protests, which went on for months “amid deep public frustration with corruption in
business, the media, and politics.”2 One of Peevski’s closest allies and the person who
allegedly financed his media group was banker Tsvetan Vasilev. A former right-wing
government was accused of “indirectly subsidising” Peevski’s media group through
deposits  by  state  entities  in  Vasilev’s  bank  in  exchange  for  political  support  by
Peevski’s  newspapers.  The  former  allies  recently  became  public  enemies.  News
reports implicated the banker’s name in an alleged murder plot against the MP and
soon after that his bank was closed down and fraud proceedings against him were
initiated. Although it is not clear how and why Peevski and Vasilev became enemies,
Peevski himself explained that the rift erupted when he refused to support Vasilev’s
political ambitions to become Prime Minister, while sources close to the banker claim
that  it  all  started when companies  associated with Peevski  defaulted on their  loan
payments.5
This saga was preceded by another long-running feud between Peevski’s media
holding  and  the  other  major  player  on  the  market—MGB.  In  WAZ’s  hands,  the
corporation  owned the  major  newspapers—close  to  the  legally  allowed  maximum
market  share  with  speculations  about  media  monopoly  (von  Dohnanyi  2003).
However, as soon as the new owners took over, an open feud between the press groups
ensued.  MGB’s  owners  were  very  high-profile  figures—Ognian  Donev,  CEO  of
Bulgaria’s biggest pharmaceutical company, and Lyubomir Pavlov, a former banker
and politician (Langley 2013). The dominating speculation was that the war started
because Peevski wanted to buy MGB but was turned down by WAZ. Almost as soon
as Pavlov and Donev took over, they were charged with fraud and money laundering.
The war  was openly led on the pages  of their  newspapers  and on TV. Numerous
articles were published about corruption practices and undue political influence. One
of the culminating events was when TV presenter Nikolay Barekov tore to pieces an
issue of Trud live on air in 2012. His show was aired by TV7—a company owned by
NBMG. Barekov called the newspaper  a rug and said that  it  would soon cease to
exist.6 Barekov is a very controversial journalist who subsequently formed a political
party in 2013, allegedly financed by Vasilev. These negative developments prompted
commentators  to  argue  that  “media  freedom  and  pluralism’  are  in  ‘jeopardy.’”2
Readers were constantly exposed to stories about the rival company/owners as well as
articles vindicating their own proprietors. Although a few recent cross-national studies
(Hanitzsch  et  al.  2011;  Štětka  2012)  have  included  interviews  with  Bulgarian
journalists on different issues, readers’ views have not really been researched. It will
be  interesting,  however,  to  find  out  how  those  readers  who  take  part  as  online
commentators  in  active,  digitally  enabled  public  discussions  around  journalism
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interpret  these  largely  negative  developments  and  what  role  they  think  journalists
(should) play in their societies:
Research Question  1: What  are  Bulgarian  online  commentators’  views  on  the
current state of journalism and how do they define “ideal” journalism?
Research Question 2: To what extent do these online conversations function as an
arena for democratic deliberation?
Method
This  is  a  mixed-methods  study  but  the  results  presented  come  mainly  from  the
qualitative analysis. The study combines quantitative content analysis with qualitative
thematic  analysis.  The initial  sample  consisted  of  the  four  biggest-selling national
dailies  owned  by  NBMG  and  MGB—Telegraph, Monitor, Trud, and  24  chasa.
Telegraph is a very cheap tabloid currently with the highest circulation in the country.
Trud and 24 Chasa are second and third in circulation. They are classified as “hybrid
tabloids”—“they combine and integrate elements of both tabloids and quality press, of
serious  and  popular,  even  scandalous  reporting”  but  they  identify  themselves  as
serious,  quality  newspapers  (Tabakova  2008).  Monitor is  the  quality  version  of
Telegraph but  again  defined  as  a  hybrid  tabloid.  Our  original  intention  was  to
download and analyze all articles and the comments underneath containing the names
of  the  (alleged)  owners  (and  associates)  of  the  two  groups—banker  Vasilev,  MP
Peevski and his mother Irena Krasteva who officially heads NBMG as well as MGB’s
owners Pavlov and Donev. However, only MGB’s newspapers allow readers to post
comments.  Telegraph has a Web site but it  contains only a screenshot of the print
edition, while  Monitor posts  stories  online but  no comments  are  allowed.  To post
comments in  24 Chasa and Trud, users have to either register (only email addresses
are required) or log in via Facebook. Verification emails are not sent out and there is
no reference to editorial policies. All user names were recorded in our database but
they are not used in the article to prevent identification. Therefore, the final sample
consists only of comments published in 24 chasa and Trud. This is a limitation of the
study that could not be avoided because it is a reflection of the actual situation. It also
gives  us  an  indication  about  the  level  of  media  freedom  and  potential  audience
empowerment.  Although  the  wider  issue  the  article  address  is  how  the  audience
perceive the real  and ideal  role of journalism, it  is  important  to underline that  the
empirical evidence analyzed here is not representative of the Bulgarian population as a
whole.  The material  analyzed  expresses  the views  of  a  particular  audience—those
online readers of a few critically important Bulgarian national newspapers who have
shown  an  interest  in  that  topic  and  publicly  expressed  their  views.  While  not
necessarily  indicative  of  the  wider  population’s  views,  this  active  and  engaged
minority takes part in a public and in principle open and participatory debate around
the real and ideal role of journalism in Bulgaria.
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Because  of  the  central  role  of  ownership  in  connecting  media  and  politics  in
Bulgaria, the data collection focused on discussions around 387 articles published with
owners’ names (keywords) mentioned in them. The articles cover the period between
December  2010  and  May  2013—when  Pavlov  and  Donev  owned  MGB.  The
comments were retrieved from the Web sites between October 2013 and May 2014.
The  list  of  hyperlinks  with  all  articles  was  downloaded  in  October  2013 and  the
comments were subsequently analyzed directly from the websites. Each comment was
coded in Bulgarian and then translated into English and included into an SPSS/NVivo
database. That left us with 5,305 comments. All articles were coded in SPSS and after
the identification of main themes, the sample was further reduced to those comments
explicitly  discussing  the  media  war—1583.  They  were  subsequently  coded
quantitatively and then analyzed thematically in nVIVO. The coding frames for the
quantitative analysis and all nodes/categories used as part of the qualitative analysis
are available on request.
Given the focus of this article, comments that contained the words “journalism,”
“journalist(s),” or “journalistic” were then analyzed qualitatively in a third stage with
the aim of identifying common themes and descriptions of audiences’ perceptions of
journalism  and  the  role  journalists  (should)  play  in  society.  This  project  is  of  a
qualitative nature and it adopts a grounded theory approach. Comments were analyzed
in an open-ended way: Rather than starting with preconceived ideas of what readers’
definition(s) of journalism might be, emerging themes were identified via the constant
comparison method and then subsequently refined (initial and focused coding) before
reaching conclusions on what readers’ definitions actually are (Fielding 2001; Glaser
and Strauss 1967). The main analytical themes in relation to the research questions are
presented in the next section. Nodes were created in NVivo and every new comment
was  either  coded under  an  existing node (emerging  from the  analysis  of  previous
comments)  or  a  new  node  was  added.  There  were  overlaps  between  the
nodes/categories and some were later grouped into broader categories. For example,
there  were  considerable  overlaps  between  readers  discussing  “real”  and  “ideal”
journalism in their online comments.
This three-stage process allowed for an initial screening and quantification based
on a coding schedule adapted from previous research (Richardson 2008;  Richardson
and Stanyer 2011), followed by an in-depth qualitative thematic analysis based on a
grounded theory approach. Nine percent of the quantitative sample was re-coded by a
second researcher.7 The qualitative categories were refined after presenting the data at
academic  conferences  and  consulting  researchers  working  on  similar  projects.
Negative  case  analysis  was  used  where  relevant.  This  is  a  standard  procedure  in
qualitative analysis—it “involves searching for and discussing elements of the data
that do not support or appear to contradict patterns or explanations that are emerging
from data analysis.”8
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“Real Journalism” versus “Ideal Journalism”: Online 
Commentators’ Verdicts
The  words  “journalism,”  “journalist(s),”  and/or  “journalistic”  were  used  in  178
comments—about 11 percent of the sample. The analysis of these comments will be
presented  in this section. Four main topics  in the articles attracted  the majority of
comments.  First,  more  than  a  third  (35.4  percent)  were  discussing  the  scandal
triggered by TV presenter Nikolay Barekov who tore to pieces an issue of Trud live on
air.  Second, a  quarter  (26.4 percent)  were about events  initiated by MGB’s owner
Pavlov  (nickname  “Papkata”)  in  an  attempt  to  clear  his  reputation  after  money
laundering and fraud charges were pressed against him and his partner as well as a
series of reports about his property portfolio abroad were published. The third topic
(14 percent)  was about the distribution war between the press groups.  A company
affiliated  to  NBMG  owned  the  distribution  chain  and  a  scandal  erupted  with
allegations about missed payments and disruptions in the distribution of rival titles.
Finally, 6.2 percent of comments were about an article in the German newspaper Die
Welt about the state of the Bulgarian media market.
What are online commentators’ definitions of journalism? Three broad categories
were identified with considerable overlaps between them. Two-thirds describe “real
journalism” or the reality of journalism; 25 percent depict “ideal journalism,” what
journalism should be, and 8.6 percent explicitly talk about freedom of expression.
Real Journalism
A few sub-themes prevail in the “real journalism” category—again with considerable
overlaps between them. Nearly half of all commentators (43.4 percent) who describe
the  current  state  of  journalism in  Bulgaria  claim the  newspaper  articles  are  “pre-
ordered”  or  “pre-paid”  by  somebody  and/or  that  journalists  themselves  pose  as
“pretend readers” and publish comments. A similar phenomenon has been observed in
other contexts—Chinese commentators refer  to the “fifty  cent party,”9 posters who
allegedly receive 50 cents per positive comment they write about government policies.
It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate whether there is evidence to support
these allegations but it is an interesting issue worth exploring in future research. A
significant  number  of  online  commentators  engage  in  discussions  that  promote
conspiracy theories—often linked with allegations about corruption practices such as
claims that  the comments  are  preordered  by a specific  individual  or  people  (most
commonly a media owner) or that other online commentators are on payroll in a rival
group10:
Reader 1: There can hardly be a bigger humiliation for a journalist than to be forced to
pretend he is a reader, write comments under his own article and then publish them by
hiding the negative ones. This is what you call freedom of expression?
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Reader 2: If somebody shows me even a single journalist who cannot be bribed and even
one  independent  medium,  this  person  will  get  a  Nobel  prize  from me for  invention.
Journalists have been and will always be dependent on someone or something.
Reader  3: Bulgarian journalists  will  sell  their mother’s  milk for  money and power!!!
What a shame!!!
Reader 4: Sue each other, why don’t you? Everyone has this right, but in the meantime
nothing is getting better. Our medicines are still expensive so that Diliana Grozdanova
(Pavlov’s wife) can sunbathe on the Riviera and some here are on payroll  defending
oligarchs for a few silver coins. Or copper coins?
Reader 5: When Peevski’s writers on payroll have difficulty digesting the facts and have
nothing  to  say  in  response,  they  try  to  divert  attention.  The  truth  is  there  is  media
monopoly and its inspirers and organizers are Peevski and his mother with the financial
support of Corporate Commercial Bank (until recently a partner in their firm).
Online  commentators  often  mention  specific  people  they  feel  are  behind  the
conspiracy  plots  and/or  corruption  practices—from  media  moguls  to  high-profile
politicians. The level of argumentation is not particularly high. Commentators often
engage with each other but though there are instances in which they tackle ideas and
views  previously  expressed,  very  often  these  dialogues  include  accusations  of
dependency  as  well  as  occasional  insults.  Any  burgeoning  discussion  is  almost
immediately stifled by corruption allegations.
Similarly damning are 39 percent  of  the comments in which readers  argue that
Bulgarian  journalism  is  manipulative  with  examples  of  stories  in  which  the
“truth”/“reality” is distorted:
Reader 6: Mr journalists, don’t mislead people through interviews with your colleagues.
It’s clear that they will reprimand Barekov’s deed in front of the mass reader but they all
say privately that he was right to expose the lies. Have you never thought of tearing a
paper up when you come across blatant lies?
Reader 7: Until the media are in the hands of oligarchs who use them for personal gain,
journalism will  be yellow press,  flash drives (a common practice is for journalists to
receive flash drives with information from anonymous sources) and articles unsupported
by evidence with lots of assumptions and libellous statements.
Reader 8: The two papers fill their pages with foreign words, write God with a small g,
publish photos of nuns dressed as prostitutes. They write against doctors, lawyers, etc.
but wouldn’t allow you to criticise their own mediocrity. I’m glad that journalists showed
their real face—mediocre, malicious, petty and illiterate.
Reader 9: Misunderstood journalism! When did objectivity and the search for impartiality
disappear? I  am tired of reading manipulative articles,  twisting the truth to  serve the
respective editorial  office.  This  is  not  journalism.  This  is  an  attack  over  freedom of
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expression forced to trade with its own body to please the sick ambitions of those who
have enough money to buy it.
Again similar issues are discussed—many online commentators think that articles
are  manipulative and  they  identify  specific  practices  as  well  as  a  potential  cause:
media ownership. This reality is seen as disappointing because they compare current
practices with idealized views of what journalism should be about—objectivity and
the  search  for  impartiality.  The  last  comment  discusses  the  state  of  current/“real”
journalism and contains a definition of “ideal” journalism. A small minority goes even
further—they compare the quality of journalism with the quality of democracy. Most
claim that the state of journalism is a direct reflection of the poor quality of democracy
and the fact that oligarchs are allowed to be as powerful:
Reader 10: Russians call their democracy демократия. Our journalism is the same as our
political life. Radical right-wing and left-wing politics, radical right-wing and left-wing
journalism. Such is Bulgaria’s демократия.
Reader 11: I’ve had enough of oligarchs such as Papkata and Donev. I will personally
stop reading 24 Chasa and Trud because true journalism in Bulgaria passed away.
Reader 12: Let us not forget that the so-called fourth estate with its readiness to sell itself,
its fruitlessness, greed, etc. (whatever negative I say, I won’t be mistaken) is to blame for
the swamp our society has delved deep into with the total exchange of values.
Most online commentators’ verdict on the quality of democracy and journalism in
Bulgaria is damning. The media war has led to an intended consequence—“oligarchs”
have come more prominently into the limelight. The comparison between Bulgaria
and other “civilised” countries (as opposed to Russia) is often present—Bulgaria is
always  described  as  inferior  and  many  online  commentators  make  references  to
countries  in  Europe  and/or  the  European  Union  as  being  “superior”/“civilised.”
Moreover,  Reader  12 claims  that  journalists  are  to  be  blame for  the  dire  state  of
society. Yet again the reality of journalism is often depicted in contrast to what “ideal”
journalism should be. In most online commentators’ eyes, journalists are not holding
the powerful into account and they are therefore (partially) to blame for the dire state
of democracy. Clearly, Bulgarian journalists do not live up to the idealized perceptions
this subset of readers has of journalists in “civilised” countries.
“Ideal Journalism”
A quarter of comments can be classified as discussing “ideal” journalism. Different
issues  are  mentioned—from  professional  standards,  values,  and  norms  such  as
objectivity  and  ethical  standards  to  serving  the  public  interest  and  more  generic
references to “normal,” “true,” or western journalism:
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Reader  13:  The publication is  rubbish—couldn’t  you just  both sides  like they  do  in
normal journalism—it’s a pity!
Reader 14: Journalists are to blame. When I say journalists are mean the real ones who do
not toady to the powerful. Good luck to the brave ones!
Reader 15: A real journalist is always led by the PUBLIC INTEREST! Whatever s/he
does, no matter what preferences s/he has, the PUBLIC INTEREST has to be defended in
the end.
Reader 16: It’s not the journalists’ job to be watchdogs of society at any cost! This can be
a main task for a rascal who keeps waving a journalism flag and critiques those in power
only to come into it (when the criticised fall down). The task of REAL JOURNALISM,
you bedpan, IS TO SERVE THE PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST!
Reader 17: It’s really unbelievable that 24 Chasa thinks its readers are so silly that they
believe the above opinion is some sort of journalism. And none of us cares about the
intrigues in your media groups. Your job is to cover the news and not to create them
through your internal intrigues.
As evident,  definitions of  “ideal” journalism revolve around what  is  sometimes
seen  as  “western”  principles—balance  and  objective  coverage,  journalism  as  the
“fourth estate” and journalists as watchdogs of society as well as the public interest.
This is an interesting finding because while  Hanitzsch et al. (2011: 286) argue that
there is a “global primacy of role perceptions that are characterized by detachment and
non-involvement,”  being  a  watchdog  of  government  and  providing  political
information, only 14 percent of Bulgarian journalists share these values. Therefore, it
appears as if Bulgarian readers in this sample have different expectations about the
role journalists should play in their society than the ones journalists themselves share.
This gap explains to an extent commentators’ negativity toward Bulgarian journalism
and journalists.  However,  Reader  16 elaborates  by arguing that  serving the public
interest  is different  from being a watchdog. Unfortunately,  none of the subsequent
comments engage with this view so the potential for fruitful discussion is not realized.
Freedom of expression 
Most of  the comments  in  this category are  very pessimistic.  Online commentators
discuss  what  they  perceive  as  journalists’  and  owners’  hypocrisy—the  fact  that
although they make big claims about freedom of expression, there does not seem to be
real freedom of expression in their own editions due to the controversial role oligarchs
play.  Some go  as  far  as  to  say  that  because  of  that,  there  is  no  real  freedom  of
expression in Bulgaria:
Reader  18:  The  article  is  a  good example  of  how journalists  can  twist  the  facts  by
modelling public opinion. The report is about ALL media and the omnipresent chairman
Slavtcheva-Petkova
14
of the Union of Publishers in Bulgaria (Lyubomir Pavlov) is the one who uses the media
to behead as it became clear from a recent recording. There is no such thing as infringing
freedom of expression, it is much more likely that the reader will get into a schizophrenic
bewilderment when faced with the multi-faceted media truth that everyone is molesting.
Reader 19: While there are paid journalists who serve Bulgarian oligarchs, there will be
no freedom of expression.
Journalists are frequently accused of not practicing what they preach and one reader
even argues that freedom in Bulgaria is equally as bad as freedom of expression:
Reader 20: My message is to everyone: change the channel, we have discovered a long
time ago that there are no professionals in all TV stations. I don’t know the journalist
(Barekov) personally, but what he did gives a bad name to journalists in Bulgaria where
freedom is wrongly interpreted. We are all for freedom but look what freedom did in
schools, in families, for the press. If he was working abroad, he would have been fired.
This reader actually echoes an argument shared by many Bulgarians “born 1970
and before”  who use  the  terms  democracy  and  freedom of  expression “with open
contempt,” because what democracy has brought about in their eyes is “networks of
oligarchies and clientilism” and “an ever-expanding economic gap” (Political Affairs
2013).  The  ongoing  media  war  between  the  two press  groups  further  exacerbates
posters’ negative views of the quality of freedom of expression in the country.
Engagement with Other Users and Quality of Argumentation
Online commentators express negative views on the state of journalism in Bulgaria,
but there are nonetheless some valid points, perceptions, and expectations they share
with one another.  However,  an interesting question yet  unanswered is whether  the
online  commentators  actually  listen  to  each  other  and  engage  in  democratic
discussions.  Slightly  more  than  half  get  involved  in  conversations  (54.5  percent).
Sixty-eight percent of them genuinely engage with issues put forward by other readers
either  by  providing  their  opinion  on  topics  previously  mentioned  or  by  asking
questions. This is a positive finding because it shows the potential for these online
spaces to turn into arenas for democratic conversations. The level of argumentation in
the comments about journalism is much higher than in all other posts discussing the
media  war  where  mutual  accusations  of  dependency  and/or  claims that  journalists
write  under  own  comment  are  common.  In  these  cases,  online  commentators
genuinely discuss each other’s ideas, reply, challenge, or agree with each other. Below
is just one example:
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Reader 21: Unfortunately, Bulgarian media fell into the hands of fraudulent oligarchs and
other artificial heroes of our transition. The journalists are to blame too. They kneeled
down to defend their salaries instead of standing up as their colleagues in any civilised
country would do when they see that their owners are trying to impose a dictatorship on
them.
Reader 22: This is an objectively substantiated opinion—I agree that journalists are to
blame.
Reader 23: I don’t think that journalists are to take the whole blame. People like Peevski
are making them like that. It’s quite another matter that they have to come out of their
handle with honour.
Nonetheless, due to the nature of online discussion and the focus of the study on
comments using the word “journalism” and its derivatives, it is hard to fully evaluate
the quality of argumentation. It is difficult to judge the extent to which participants
“open  themselves  up  to  the  possibility  of  having  their  opinion  changed  by  the
standpoint and reasoning of other participants” (Richardson & Stanyer 2011: 1000).
Furthermore, while this potential for democratic discussion is utilized by some, a key
feature of the majority of comments (89.3 percent) is their negativity. Overall, online
commentators  pass a very negative verdict  on the state  of journalism and the role
journalists play.  Very  few side with their  newspaper  (namely,  the newspaper  they
publish  their  comments  in)  and  its  owners.  The  majority  are  disappointed  by  the
negative articles about the media war that constantly appear. The following post best
summarizes the prevailing sentiment:
Reader 24: That’s enough! Barekov tore Trud up to pieces and the guild started shouting
“fascism”! What is left for Barekov and his people but to start shouting “communism”
and the show will be complete. The fight for viewers and readers reached its culmination
—that’s why they decided to drive the whole society crazy. I don’t want to hear about
your  problems every  minute  and hour  of  the day,  you  pseudo journalists,  who have
distanced yourselves from real problems and have focused so much on your owners’
issues! How much circulation goes down the toilets of millions of Bulgarians and this is
the  greatest  use  of  the  so-called  journalism so  that  we  have  to  deal  with  a  torn-up
newspaper? The truth is simple—no one trusts you, people are just having fun. The fact
that you are so childish—playing fascists and partisans—will not move anyone!
Commentators are clearly disillusioned and often share stories about how they or
people they know have stopped buying their newspaper regularly. “We are not fools”
is  also  a  statement  that  appears  occasionally—indicating  audiences’  perceived
empowerment. As most of the comments show, these actively engaged readers are not
fools indeed. They clearly acknowledge some of the issues and challenges journalists
face—mainly as a result of the pressures they experience from their owners. However,
participants included in our sample have no sympathy for them—they do not condone
Slavtcheva-Petkova
16
what they regard as poor, manipulative, or corrupt journalistic practices—servile and
mercenary articles and “toadying to the powerful.”
Conclusion
The study shows that  online commentators  in our sample have clear  views on the
present state of journalism and provide interesting definitions of what journalism is or
should be.  Audiences’  perspectives  are  important  (van der  Wurff  and Schoenbach
2014) because they can potentially play two key roles in a democracy: (1) They can
provide an online arena for democratic debate, and (2) they can also be used as a tool
for journalistic accountability. The qualitative nature of this study also allowed us to
adopt a grounded theory approach by analyzing online commentators’ opinions in an
open-ended way. Scholars rarely differentiate between real and ideal journalism as if
the two are effectively the same (some notable exceptions include Mancini 2000 and
Waisbord 2000). Online commentators, however,  clearly do that. They differentiate
between “the reality of journalism” or “real  journalism” and what they perceive as
“ideal  journalism.” They depict a dire picture of “real  journalism” as manipulative
with examples  of  “pre-paid” or  “pre-ordered”  articles  and journalists  serving their
owners’ interests. This negative portrayal is in contrast to the professional ideals many
readers  believe  in—balance  and  objectivity,  media’s  informational  role,  and
journalists as watchdogs serving the public interest. The online commentators’ ideas
of what journalism should be about coincide with the ideals journalists share around
the world (albeit predominantly in western countries; Hanitzsch et al. 2011). However,
these  are  not  the  ideals  Bulgarian  journalists  themselves  cherish  (Hanitzsch  et  al.
2011).  If  this  is  indicative  of  how the  wider  public  views  journalism,  this  major
contradiction  helps  explain  the  widening  gap  in  expectations  and  trust  between
Bulgarian journalists and their readers. Journalists seem to be experiencing an identity
crisis—they are caught between their own perceptions of their role as mainly populist
disseminators  or  critical  change  agents  (Hanitzsch  et  al.  2011),  readers’  idealized
views  of  journalists  as  detached  watchdogs,  and  the  numerous  pressures  and
challenges from their oligarch owners. This is a very worrying trend indeed because it
has far-reaching implications for the state of democracy in the country. The van der
Wurff and Schoenbach (2014) study shows that audiences expect a certain degree of
responsiveness.  Nielsen’s (2014) survey of 583 U.S. journalists, however, found that
journalists often ignore reader input because their journalistic norms and conceptions
of expertise prevent them from engaging with their readers.  One noticeable change
that occurred in the course of this research is that the initial articles published about
the media war between the two press groups were signed whereas the latest ones were
unsigned. Future studies with journalists might further explore the accountability and
responsiveness issue particularly in relation to role conceptions. It is certainly worth
conducting more immersive,  in-depth studies that  compare a publication’s  readers’
views with those of the journalists working for the same organization.
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Nonetheless, the very fact that we can paint such a picture on the basis of online
comments indicates an important trend. Despite a growing body of cyberpessimistic
studies,  there is some scope for  temperate cyberoptimism. The online space, albeit
very limited in Bulgaria due to the fact that not all big newspapers have online fora, is
and can be an important arena for democratic conversations in a country in transition
from communism to democracy. It may not yet be fully developed as a virtual public
sphere especially if we adhere strictly to Habermas’s normative ideal but it is certainly
an important virtual public space (Papacharissi 2002). A refining of or a move away
from deliberative theory would certainly help better explain the situation we observe
in  Bulgaria.  An  important  task  for  future  research  is  a  reconceptualization  of
Habermas’s normative ideal in light of a growing body of evidence and especially in
relation to the potential role virtual public spaces (as opposed to public spheres) play
vis-à-vis democracy (Loke 2013; Papacharissi 2002). A systematic or in the very least
a narrative review of existing work would be a useful first step in that direction. More
qualitative work would also offer useful insights. Cross-national comparative research
will further show us what contextual (political, economic, and cultural) factors play a
role  in  the  process  of  online  deliberation.  This  study clearly  showed  that  context
matters, and the fact that the online spaces of western newspapers are full of insulting
comments (Richardson and Stanyer 2011) does not mean that  the same trends are
evident in democracies in transition. The majority of comments are very negative but
they  discuss  specific  issues,  and  while  some  contain  offensive  statements  or
accusations, these are a minority in comparison with the ones that genuinely engage in
discussion and debate. Some of the discussions are indeed stifled in their infancy by
conspiracy theories  and mutual  accusations,  but although this is true for  the larger
sample,  the situation is different in the comments explicitly discussing the state of
journalism. However, we should not jump to any grand conclusions because the level
of argumentation could not be explored in much depth due to the focus on comments
about journalism.
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Notes
1. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/business/international/large-bulgarian-bank-goes-
bankrupt.html.
2. https://www.opendemocracy.net/v%C3%A1clav-%C5%A0t%C4%9Btka/there-and-back-
again-media-freedom-and-autonomy-in-central-and-eastern-europe.
3. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/bulgaria#.VImrBv3ri70.
4. A list of business tycoons in ten CEE countries is provided in Štětka (2012).
5. http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=4145749.
6. http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/alde-affiliated-bulgarian-rogue-
candidate-withdraws-302394.
7. Joyce argues that there is no clear standard for the percentage of content units one should
recode to calculate agreement rates, and in general, it is lower for online content. See more
at  http://digital-activism.org/2013/05/picking-the-best-intercoder-reliability-statistic-for-
your-digital-activism-content-analysis/#sthash.FPiR3pzr.dpuf.
8. http://www.qualres.org/HomeNega-3694.html.
9. https://freedomhouse.org/blog/china’s-growing-army-paid-internet-
commentators#.VZKcT0u0Jg0.
10. The online comments are numbered 1 to 24 for the purposes of this article only.
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